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Abstract
e automotive industry is in for signiﬁcant changes in the years to come. With the
acknowledgment of greenhouse gases as a major contribution to global temperature
rise, energy usage sees a transition in favor of renewable sources. Adding the uncer-
tainty of whether a peak-oil production is reached or not, fossil fuels are no longer
considered reliable. In the wake of this, new candidates emerge as alternatives to the
existing car ﬂeet technology. Standards and regulations are continuously being up-
dated to ensure safety and reliability, but it is ultimately up to the technology itself to
adopt if it is to survive.
is project focus on personnel safety issues that arise from electric vehicle charg-
ing. Speciﬁcally, some new concepts of battery charging infringe on the possibility to
use a safety ground connection to reduce the risk of electric shock. e project intent
is to ﬁnd an alternative solution for such concepts by means of active detection and
limitation of the chassis potential.
e report shows promising results. Sensors mounted on the vehicle body can be
used to collect a good ground reference without an actual safety ground connection.
An on-board current source can then be used to make the chassis potential follow
the reference. However, unresolved issues remain that needs to be addressed. ese
include a less insulated voltage class B system, a.c. signals that could potentially prop-
agate to the electric chassis and uncertain resistivity values for plausible fault types.
ese should be evaluated in future work as well as constructing a physical model of
the system.
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Nomenclature
Symbols
i current
v voltage
g switch state
s signal
C capacitance
V electric potential
R resistance
A, B, C contact points
Indexes
X1, X2 chassis-to-pickup, positive and negative lead
Xp, Xn chassis-to-battery, positive and negative lead
Xr, X0 rail potentials, positive and negative (0 V)
Xh through or across a human body
Xt tyres
Xref reference value for chassis or current source
Xfeed feed current or compensation current
Xch chassis
Xctrl control
Xskin, Xbody human body characteristics, skin and internal body
Xa, Xb, Xc rail-to-sensor contact points
Abbreviations
BEV battery electric vehicle
BMS battery management system
BOEV battery-only electric vehicle
ECU electric control unit
EMC electromagnetic compatibility
v
ERS Electric Road System
EV electric vehicle
FCEV fuel cell electric vehicle
HEV hybrid electric vehicle
ICEV internal combustion engine vehicle
PHEV plugin hybrid electric vehicle
RCD residual current device
REEV range-extended electric vehicle
a.c. alternating current
d.c. direct current
rms root mean square
Most symbols and terms are shown here. A symbol or term not shown is either self-
explanatory, non-important or explained close to where is was used.
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Chapter1
Introduction
e idea of electriﬁed transportation extends back to the beginning of the nineteenth
century, following the invention of the electric motor. Electric vehicles (EV's) were
introduced in the 1850's, and by the 1900's they constituted a signiﬁcant share of the
leisure car market, notably in the United States [1, p. 2]. However, EV's were typi-
cally expensive and short-ranged and could not compete with the emerging internal
combustion engine technologies.
In the late twentieth century, a growing awareness of global warming spread across
the globe. Fossil fuels were recognised as a dirty and insecure source of energy, and the
demand for cleaner and more environmentally friendly sources was evident. Conse-
quently, electric vehicles became popular again. As of early 2015, there were roughly
740,000 electric cars on the road worldwide, of which about 320,000 were registered
in 2014 [2].
is master thesis project focus on a grounding system interface for EV's con-
ductively connected to an earth grounded electric supply, where a sturdy low-ohmic
connection from vehicle chassis to ground can not be established. An example of
when this is relevant is the Slide-in ERS project [3]; a project based on the concept
of conductive continuous power transfer from road to vehicle during propulsion. In
it, the physical contact between vehicle and power supply slides on two rails that are
connected to ground and an elevated potential, respectively. Due to irregularities in
the road and possibly soiled rail sections, such a contact could never guarantee a low-
ohmic connection. us, it does not suﬃce as grounding in today's standards and
regulations.
1.1 Scope and Constraints
An alternative to the conventional safety ground connection is evaluated by means of
simulations and experiments. It resembles an on-board system that actively monitors
and controls the chassis potential. Important components are sensors that deﬁne a
good ground reference, a current source that limits the chassis potential to a desired
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level and a control unit used for fault monitoring and current regulation. A full ex-
planation of the system is given in chapter 3. e project involves identiﬁcation of
relevant standards on personnel safety, generation and simulation of a system model,
and experiments to verify the ﬁndings.
e work was carried out at the department of Industrial Electrical Engineering
and Automation at the Faculty of Engineering (LTH) at Lund Universiy. It was lim-
ited to only include single fault scenarios with the ambition to test a conceptual design
rather than generating a complete safety system.
1.1.1 Redendum
Due to a tight time schedule, the experiments were not ﬁnished in time. For this
reason, work regarding the physical model of the system has been excluded from the
report and instead added in Appendix C.
1.2 Outline
An overview of relevant safety aspects regarding both electric vehicles and the human
body can be found in chapter 2. is is followed by a description of the system
model in chapter 3, an illustration of the simulation process in chapter 4, the project
results in chapter 5, discussion in chapter 6 and, lastly, conclusions and future work
in chapter 7. Symbols for relevant electric components are depicted in Appendix A,
simulation blocks of minor importance in Appendix B and the experimental work in
Appendix C.
Chapter2
eory
is chapter's topic is grid-connected electric systems and the risk they pose to human
bodies. An introductory description of an electric vehicle is ﬁrst given. is includes
important safety features and standards. Next section is on battery charging methods
with examples of conventional solutions and how safety measures are implemented.
e last section covers electrical properties of the human body and its reaction to
electric shock.
2.1 The Electric Vehicle
In this report, an electric vehicle (EV) is deﬁned as an electric car, bus or truck if
nothing else is mentioned. Conventionally, the phrase also includes other vehicles
that convert electricity to motive power, such as trams, trains and trolleybuses. ey
are discussed in short but are not the focus of this project. Furthermore, a variety of
electric vehicles with varying system conﬁgurations exist. Examples are hybrid elec-
tric vehicles (HEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), battery electric vehi-
cles (BEVs), battery-only electric vehicles (BOEVs), range-extended electric vehicles
(REEVs) and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). To avoid confusion and the need
of describing similar conﬁgurations several times, only the BOEV will be explained
more throughly.
2.1.1 Battery-only electric vehicle
Also referred to as an all-electric vehicle, the BOEV relies solely on an electric motor
for propulsion. Compared to an internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV), the ad-
vantages are plenty, e.g. high electric machine eﬃciency, low levels of emission, lower
noise, smoother operation and the possibility to implement regenerative braking [1,
p. 492]. Although the other technologies mentioned above have similar advantages,
the all-electric vehicle is better suited as a reference for this project. Namely, its fuel
is all-electric.
3
4 Theory
e main components of a BOEV's powertrain are illustrated in Figure 2.1. A
battery pack, made up of several batteries such as lead-acid or lithium-ion [1, p. 497],
constitutes the main source or energy. e other source is the auxiliary battery. Al-
though essential for low-voltage applications such as lighting systems and radio, the
auxiliary battery will not be discussed in this report. Its low-voltage characteristics
does not make it a safety risk.
.battery
pack
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DC
converter
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inverter
motor
clutch
gearbox and
diﬀerential
−
+ drive
shaft
drive wheel
drive wheel
Figure 2.1: Typical powertrain of an all-electric vehicle.
Continuing on from the battery pack, a converter may be used to step up the bat-
tery voltage to more suitable levels. e voltage is then fed to an inverter that changes
the direct current (d.c.) to three-phase alternating current (a.c.) that powers the mo-
tor. Of course, this is only done if the vehicle is powered by a three-phase a.c. motor.
If a d.c. motor is used, there is instead need for an additional converter. However,
the most common form of electric machines in EV's today are a.c. motors. Common
types are permanent magnet motors, induction machines and switched reluctance
motors [1, p. 8].
e electronic control unit (ECU) is the main control unit and regulates the
motor power consumption based on signals from pedals and diﬀerent sensors in the
vehicle. It also controls the direction of power ﬂow. When accelerating, power ﬂows
from the motor to the drive shaft. When braking, power ﬂows in the opposite direc-
tion and recharges the battery pack. Battery recharging is monitored and regulated
by the battery management system (BMS) to ensure safe operation.
Power transfer from motor to wheels is accomplished by the drivetrain. Several
conﬁgurations are possible. e major components are a clutch, a gearbox, a diﬀeren-
tial, a drive shaft and drive wheels [1, p. 495 – 496]. is is true for most automobiles
including non-electric vehicles. e workings are as follows: A clutch is used to en-
gage or disengage the transmission of torque frommotor to wheels, for example when
changing gears. e ratio of torque to angular velocity is controlled with a gearbox
that connects to a diﬀerential. e diﬀerential distributes the angular velocity so that
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Figure 2.2: Electrical properties of an EV. Capacitors represent stray ca-
pacitances and resistors without label represent insulation resistances.
Note that the d.c./d.c. converter shown here is supplied as part of the
charging system and not the same as in Figure 2.1.
the drive wheels can rotate at diﬀerent speeds. is is very useful when turning the
vehicle. Finally, the drive wheels convert the transmitted energy to surface friction on
the road and the vehicle is propelled forward.
A simpliﬁed model of an EV's electrical properties is shown in Figure 2.2. e
powertrain is reduced to only include the traction battery, the inverter and the motor.
However, since the motor and inverter are modelled as a resistive load, there are ac-
tually only two components shown. Other features are insulation, stray capacitances
and tyres. e ﬁgure also includes connections for battery charging and a d.c./d.c.
converter that isolates the on-board circuity from the external power source. Battery
charging will be explained in section 2.2. Another feature, perhaps the most impor-
tant regarding the scope of this thesis, is the common ground reference also known
as the electric chassis.
2.1.2 The ground reference
All electric systems need a clear electric potential reference from which voltages are de-
ﬁned. Stationary systems are therefore in contact with a sturdy low-ohmic conductor
thoroughly connected to the utility grid ground potential. In everyday language, this
is simply referred to as ground. e ground connection prevents voltages generated
in e.g. a power plant to elevate above earth's potential.
A system without a ground accumulates charge over time. When the charge
reaches dangerously high levels, discharges from system to ground can occur. An
example of this is lightning strikes during a lightning storm. Here, potential diﬀer-
ences between high altitudes and the earth ionises the air and creates a conductive
path. Extraordinary large amounts of charges ﬂow through the air over an extremely
short time. Since similar discharges to ground are not wanted in electric systems, a
ground connection is used to prevent it from happening.
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In mobile applications, a connection to earth is not always easy to establish. In-
stead, something called a ﬂoating ground is used as a well-deﬁned reference for all
involved electric systems. In EV's, the ﬂoating ground is the electric chassis and con-
stitutes a metal frame. It is normally the same as the negative lead of the auxiliary
battery. Although good enough as potential reference, the chassis alone does not
make a good ground. A connection to earth is also necessary. erefore, vehicle tyres
are made slightly conductive to dissipate possible static charges [4].
2.1.3 Safety speciﬁcations
ere are two diﬀerent electric systems in an EV: the voltage class A system and the
voltage class B system. Voltage class A and B refers to the voltage level and are deﬁned
in [5] as
Voltage class A - classiﬁcation of an electric component or circuit with a maximum
working voltage of less than 30 V a.c. (rms) or 60 V d.c.
Voltage class B - classiﬁcation of an electric component or circuit with a maximum
working voltage between than 30V a.c. (rms) and 1000V a.c. (rms) or between
60 V d.c. and 1500 V d.c.
A circuit powered by the auxiliary battery is thus categorised as voltage class A and the
traction circuitry previously described as voltage class B. Due to the higher voltage in
class B circuits, safety criteria are stricter as compared to class A. Some of them are
listed below:
Capacitive couplings For d.c. body currents caused by discharge of capacitive cou-
plings between a voltage class B potential and electric chassis when touching
d.c. class B voltage, one of the following options shall be fulﬁlled:
• energy of the total capacitive between any energized voltage class B live
part and the electric chassis shall be <0.2 J at its maximum working
voltage; total capacitance should be calculated based on designed values
of related parts and components;
• alternative mechanical or electrical measures for d.c. voltage class B elec-
tric circuit, as explained below.
Alternative electrical or mechanical measures include the following:
• double or reinfoced insulation instead of basic insulation;
• one or more layers of insulation, barriers and/or enclosures in addition
to the basic protection;
• rigid barriers/enclosures with suﬃcient mechanical robustness and dura-
bility, over the vehicle service life.
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De-energisation e voltage class B electric circuit in question may be de-energised
as a protection measure. e monitoring of faults within the circuit or the
detection of events may be used to trigger the de-energisation. One of the
following conditions shall be met for the de-energised circuit.
• e voltage shall be reduced to less than 30 V a.c. (rms) for a.c. and 60
V d.c. (rms) for d.c. circuits.
• e total stored energy in the system shall be <0.2 J.
Isolation resistance requirements e minimum isolation resistance shall be at least
100 
/V for d.c. circuits and at least 500 
/V for a.c. circuits. e reference
shall be the maximum working voltage.
Requirements for vehicle power inlet e vehicle power inlet shall comply with at
least one of the following requirements:
• de-energise the circuit within 1 s;
• de-energise in a time speciﬁed by the manufacturer and IPXXB.
e vehicle power inlet intended to be conductively connected to the grid
shall have a terminal for connecting the vehicle electric chassis to the ground
of the grid. e isolation resistance at the vehicle power inlet, which includes
circuits conductively connected to the grid during charging, shall be at least
1 M
 when the charge coupler is disconnected.
2.1.4 Example of fault monitoring
An implementation of the monitoring of faults mentioned above is shown in Figure
2.3. Supposedly, this is the solution implemented in Volvo cars. Due to lack of
written references, a similar system can be found in [6]. e implementation involves
physical resistors of 375 k
 connected from chassis to each lead of the battery. e
reference uses larger and nonuniform values, but all resistances that fulﬁll the isolation
resistance requirements for a.c. circuits are valid. e criterion is
R
v
 500 
/V (2.1)
from section 2.1.3. With a working voltage of 600 V, the minimum allowed resis-
tance is 300 k
. It is even arguable that the criterion on d.c. circuits should be used, in
which case the minimum resistance is much less. Moreover, capacitors are connected
across the resistors. Note that these are not physical capacitors but rather stray capac-
itances. ey usually result from Y capacitors, used for electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) reasons, or parasitic capacitive couplings [5, p. 6]. Each stray capacitance has
a value of 0:6 F, equaling a stored energy roughly the same as in [6].
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Figure 2.3: Schematics of monitoring system. An open switch is repre-
sented with 0 and a closed switch with 1.
Two switches, each connected in series with one of the resistors, are controlled
with 0.25 Hz signals. e frequency can be kept rather low since a fault between
battery lead and chassis does not normally result in a personnel safety issue. e two
signals are phase-shifted 180° so that one is always open when the other is closed.
When the switches' states change every half period, electric charges ﬂow through the
closed switch. Any stored energy in the capacitance is emptied and the voltage goes
to zero. Since no charge can ﬂow through the other switch, the voltage across it
builds up which stores energy in the capacitance. As time passes, the voltages changes
periodically as seen in Figure 2.4.
In the event of a fault from either battery lead to chassis, or a changed stray
capacitance value, the voltage output change accordingly. If too large a fault or too
high a capacitance value, a contactor (a type of switch) in series with the battery opens
to prevent dangerous currents to ﬂow.
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Figure 2.4: Typical signals in a fault-free monitoring system.
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2.2 Charging the Battery
Energy can neither be destroyed nor created; it can only be converted into another
form. erefore, as the electric machine and drivetrain of an EV converts electric
energy to kinetic energy, the stored energy inside the battery is depleted. To replenish
it, a connection between power grid and EV is established. ere are several ways this
can be done, some of which are explained here. Prior to this, however, an introduction
to power transmission and the need for safety ground is given.
2.2.1 The grid
e grid connects power plants and other electricity producers with the end con-
sumers. In Sweden, the grid can be divided into the national grid at 220–400 kV,
the regional network at 40–130 kV and the local network at 0.4–20 kV [7, p. 13].
e diﬀerent grid levels are separated with so called substations that transform one
voltage to another. Since the Swedish grid carry a.c. (50 Hz), the transformation is
done with transformers.
An important feature of transformers is that they constitute a galvanic isolation
between two systems. It means that an electron current can not ﬂow from one of the
systems to the other. is is due to the very nature of electromagnetic induction; the
underlying phenomenon on which the transformer relies. When a current ﬂows into
a transformer's primary side, the ﬁrst thing to happen is the conversion of electric
energy to magnetic energy. e energy then continues through an iron core to the
secondary side, where it is converted back to electric energy again. No electron current
ﬂows inside the core itself, meaning that electrons ﬂowing into the transformer on one
side also ﬂows out on the same side.
A direct consequence of this is that the dissipation of charges between two systems
no longer is possible. From a safety perspective, this means that both systems must
have separate ground connections in order to be protected from discharges to ground,
as explained in section 2.1.2. is is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
.
Producer Substation Substation Consumer
220–400 kV 40–130 kV 0.4–20 kV
Figure 2.5: Swedish grid.
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2.2.2 Safety ground
As previously explained, a ground is established in most electric systems. It is used
to uniquely deﬁne voltages and to prevent charges to accumulate in a system so that
no dangerous discharges can occur. However, this results in another issue: if an ob-
ject touches the ground reference and a grounded electric system simultaneously, the
object forms a closed circuit from system to ground through which current can ﬂow.
is is known as a leakage current and is not desired. Under bad circumstances, such
a current can be very large and potentially cause damage to the object. By introducing
a safety ground, this can be avoided.
An example is illustrated in Figure 2.6. e object is a human and the system
constitutes a grounded grid that powers an electric appliance. e appliance is mod-
elled as a resistor, which draws a current iload from the grid, and a metal casing. All
powered system parts are insulated and can therefore not be touched during normal
operation. However, the insulation which separates the system from the casing has
failed. is is symbolised as the leakage current if through a fault resistor. In the
left ﬁgure (Figure 2.6a), there is no safety ground. is simply means that the metal
casing is not connected to ground. erefore, the current that ﬂows through the fault
continues through the human to ground and back to the grid. e value of the current
ih depends on several factors such as grid voltage, fault resistance and the electrical
properties of the human. In a case were the fault resistance is small and the human is
soaked in water, ih would be dangerously high.
Additionally, there is onemore protective component that needs to bementioned:
the fuse. It is depicted as a box with a line through it and prevents large currents to
.
+
load
 
grid
Electric Appliance
fault
if
ih
if
i i
iload
(a) Without safety ground.
.
+
load
 
grid
Electric Appliance
fault
if
is
ih
if
i i
iload
(b) With safety ground.
Figure 2.6: Illustration of a safety ground connection.
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ﬂow. A fuse is rated to trip at a speciﬁed amperage, meaning that the fuse still conducts
if the current is too low. Typical currents that are dangerous to a human body are not
enough to make most fuses trip, rendering the fuse rather worthless in said scenario.
As opposed to the left ﬁgure, the right one (Figure 2.6b) does have a safety ground.
Here, the fault current splits into two parts: the current ih from before and another
current, is. e safety ground is depicted as a simple line since it is typically low-
ohmic, so most (if not all) leakage current if would go straight to ground instead of
ﬁrst taking the path through the human. Note that the actual current through the
human is not signiﬁcantly reduced as compared to the previous scenario. e safety
lies in the extremely large total current i, which will trip the fuse and brake the circuit.
As a last remark, very often there are other safety features in addition to the safety
ground. An example is the residual-current device (RCD) installed in most house-
holds. It is a device that monitors the net current ﬂow between household and grid.
In normal operation, no current can ﬂow anywhere except where it is supposed to
and the net current is very close to zero. However, in the event of a fault, a new path
for the current is introduced, resulting in a net ﬂow that diﬀers from zero. is is
detected by the RCD, which disconnects the household from the grid.
e RCD is a signiﬁcant device in some areas of technology. In this project,
though, it is not very important.
2.2.3 Plug-in connectors
Conventional methods for charging of electric car batteries involve plug-in connectors
designed for higher voltage and amperage than ordinary wall sockets. ere are several
designs available on the market, although the more common ones are:
SAE J1772 Designed for up to 32 A one-phase a.c. currents. It is not likely to play
a signiﬁcant role in the future, at least not in Europe [8, p. 17]. Referred to as
a type 1 implementation.
Mennekes Also known as a type 2 connector. It manages currents of 70 A one-phase
or 63 A three-phase a.c. [8, p 18]. It is one of the two current standards in
Europe.
Combo 2 e other standard in Europe. It combines two diﬀerent kinds of contacts
and can therefore be used for both a.c. and d.c. charging. A.c. charging speed
is typically slower than d.c. [8, p 19].
CHAdeMO A Japanese solution based on d.c. charging. Maximum voltage is 500
V and maximum current is 120 A [8, p. 18 – 19].
e connectors are depicted in Figure 2.7. ey may be diﬀerent in appearance and
pin setup, but they all have a way of dealing with protection against electric shock. e
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Type 1 Type 2
Combo 2 CHAdeMO
Figure 2.7: Plug-in connectors.1
type 1, type 2 and Combo 2 use safety ground connections [9], whereas CHAdeMO
make use of transformers to galvanically isolate the connector from the grid [10].
2.2.4 Trolleybuses
Trolleybuses are electric buses powered via two overhead power lines typically under
a d.c. voltage of 600–750 V [11]. eir appearance diﬀer signiﬁcantly from other
buses in that trolleys are mounted on the roofs. e driver can manually attached or
detached the trolleys to and from the lines, making it possible to make small detours
from the lines as long as on-board batteries are in place. However, this is not always
the case, and many trolleybuses are ﬁxed to a predeﬁned route much like a train or a
tram. Today, there are more than 40,000 trolleybuses in service worldwide, of which
about three quarters are located in eastern Europe. [11, p. 469]
Like most road vehicles, trolleybuses operate on rubber tyres. us, there is no
simple way to establish a safety ground. e solution to this problem is called double
or triple insulation [11, p. 472], which in short means stricter insulation criteria for
trolleybuses as compared to e.g. plug-in electric vehicles. For instance, the resistance
requirement between body and high voltage circuits is minimum 5 M
 and between
body and positive lead of low voltage circuits minimum 1 M
 [12, p. 124]. Extra
insulation adds weight to the vehicle, and although it may be ﬁne for larger vehicles
such as buses, it may be undesired in smaller cars.
1Electric Vehicle Institute. Plug-In Around the EV World. Retrieved September 2, 2015
from http://www.ev-institute.com/images/Plug_World_map_v5.pdf.
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2.2.5 Slide-in Electric Road System
In 2014, Volvo GTT published a report on a charging system that powers EV's con-
ductively via powered rail sections on the ground [3]. e system is called Slide-in
Electric Road System (ERS) and is similar to the concept used in this project. It is de-
signed for highway use as one of two plausible alternatives currently being evaluated.
e other alternative is based on induction but will not be discussed here.
Two conductive rails are placed side by side on the road, as seen in Figure 2.8.
One of the rails is divided into shorter sections whereas the other is continuous. e
shorter sections constitute the positive lead and can individually be powered to 750
V [3, p. 33]. Initially, though, all sections are at ground potential V0. Power boxes
placed along the road act as the interface between grid and rails and converts the grid
voltage to lower levels. A connector or pickup is mounted on the vehicle underbody
to be used for rail connection when desired.
.
V0
750 V or V0750 V or V0 750 V or V0
v
Figure 2.8: Illustration of the ERS.
When a vehicle-to-rail connection is established, a sensor system determines the
position of the car and powers the corresponding section. Since the rails are much
longer than the car, most of the powered section is exposed. is means a personnel
safety risk and precautions must be taken accordingly. As a safety measure, the length
of the sections were chosen to the distance a vehicle travels every second at a speed
of 60 km/h. A time interval of one second was chosen to be the reaction time of a
human standing in front of a driving car. In other words, if pedestrians were to touch
a section while it is powered, they would get hit by the car that activated it. erefore,
the exposed parts of a powered rail section does not mean any additional safety risk.
Note that this is only true if a car travels at least 60 km/h, why the system is designed
to not be activated if a car travels slower than that.
Although the project is quite extensive, a safety ground connection has not been
considered in the report. In the event of an electric fault, there is nothing that controls
the chassis potential. One way to solve this is to assume similar criteria on insulation
as in trolleybus technology. However, cars are much smaller than buses and would
suﬀer more from the increased weight and volume. erefore, solutions such as the
one presented in this report could be interesting, the details of which are explained in
section 3.
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2.3 Electricity and the Human Body
An object in contact with two diﬀerent electric potentials draws a current based on
the object's conductive properties. e higher the conductivity, the higher the current
ﬂow. Although high currents are wanted in some electrical machines, it is not desired
in the human body tissue. If too high, a human can suﬀer from burns, shock and
even death.
In electric safety calculations, the human body is typically distinguished as a se-
ries connection of the skin and internal body. is is shown in Figure 2.9. Here,
a capacitance Cskin in parallel with a resistance Rskin models the skin, whereas a sole
resistorRbody models the internal body. e total current ih is referred to as the touch
current, a recurring term throughout this document. Furthermore, A and B represent
contact points.
.A
ih
Rskin
Cskin
Rbody
B
Figure 2.9: Simple model of a human body.
Typical values for the resistances and capacitance are Rbody = 500 
, Rskin =
1500 
 and Cskin = 0.66 F [13]. ese values represents a scenario in which the
human body's conductivity is greatly increased. Such a scenario is chosen to ensure a
maximum possible current through the body. Normally, however, the skin resistance
varies signiﬁcantly with external conditions and can reach values greatly exceeding that
in the model [14]. Some examples are shown in Table 2.1. Moreover, the internal
body resistance is tissue dependent. Muscles tend to be characterised as low-ohmic
and fat as high-ohmic.
Table 2.1: Resistances for certain skin conditions. Units in k
.
Condition
Submersed in water 1.2–1.5
Sweat 2.5
Dry skin 10–40
Sole of foot 100–200
Heavily calloused palm 1,000–2,000
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Of course, not all touch currents are dangerous. A large current may be very
dangerous to the human body, whereas a small current may not even be noticeable.
Touch currents are therefore often categorised after corresponding bodily reactions,
as see in Table 2.2 [13]. Notice that the thresholds are roughly three to four times
higher for d.c. than for a.c. e diﬀerence is due to the fact that a.c. alternates and
d.c. does not.
Table 2.2: Important touch current thresholds.
reshold a.c. (mA) d.c. (mA)
Tingling sensation 0.5 2
Strong muscular reaction 5–10 25
Ventricular ﬁbrillation 40–100 140–200
An alternating current of 40–110 Hz can give rise to continuous muscle contrac-
tions [14], potentially preventing a person from releasing a current source if touched
with a hand. is prolongs the duration of exposure to the electrical circuit, thus
increasing the risk of permanent damage to the body. Often, the phrase let-go current
is used when referring to the a.c. threshold for strong muscular reactions. A direct
current, on the other hand, does not give rise to continuous contractions. Instead,
d.c. tends to produce a single muscle spasm with the potential of sending a person
ﬂying. Although increasing the risk of blunt injury on impact, this actually decreases
the exposure time.
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System Description
In this chapter, the system details are described. Plausible fault scenarios and safety
requirements are incorporated in the ﬁrst section along with an overview of the system
schematic. is is follow by sections on the main system elements.
3.1 Schematic
e system schematic is illustrated in Figure 3.1. e system inputs are two potentials,
Vr and V0, supplied via powered rail sections in the road. ese potentials are collected
by low-conductance sensors and distinguished as high and ground potential. e
ground potential Vgnd is then sent to a control unit along with the vehicle chassis
potential Vch. From these two values, a reference signal sref is generated and sent to
an on-board current source, which feeds the chassis with a current ifeed. e result is
a feedback system that monitors and limits the chassis potential.
If the rails fail to provide a good ground potential, the control unit signals the
pickup to disconnect from the power supply Psupply. is also applies when there is a
too elevated fault from chassis to either polarity of the powered rails.
.Powered rails
Sensors Control unit Current source
Chassis
Vr V0
Vgnd sref
ifeed
Vch
Psupply
s
Figure 3.1: System schematic.
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3.1.1 Assumptions and limitations
During normal operation, the chassis potential does not pose a threat to humans. A
high resistance from chassis to Vr prevents an elevated touch current to ﬂow. ere-
fore, a problem only exists when the resistance drops for some unwanted reason. is
is known as a fault from chassis to Vr. On the other hand, a fault from chassis to V0 is
not really a threat to personnel safety since it would act as a ground connection. It is
unwanted due to other reasons, though, but since this report is on the topic personnel
safety, it will only be considered slightly.
Table 3.1: Plausible fault scenarios. Note that a lost pickup contact is
not considered a fault, but rather normal operation.
Anomaly Example scenarios
Fault from chassis to Vr or V0 Insulation degradation, ice on pickup
Lost sensor contact Soil or ice on rail
Plausible fault scenarios are shown in Table 3.1. Note that a single-fault scenario
approach is used. is means that two or more simultaneous faults are considered
impossible. is limits the generality of the result but greatly reduce the complexity
of models. Furthermore, some single fault scenarios are excluded from the project.
ese include faults from chassis to the on-board voltage class B system, faults from
chassis to the on-board class A system and component failures other than insulation
degradation from pickup to chassis. Lastly, four system criteria was generated to help
ensure personnel safety. ey are found in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Safety criteria on system.
# Safety criterion
1 e chassis potential Vch must be kept at an acceptable
level when the vehicle is connected to the grid.
2 A safety system must be able to handle arbitrarily large
faults. Faults below a desired threshold resistance must
be detected by the system.
3 e system must function under normal conditions,
which includes road bumps and icy rails.
4 Sensors must be able to distinguish Vr from V0 and pick
the right potential as Vgnd. ey must also distinguish a
valid ground reference from a bad ground reference.
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3.2 Rails
In this project, the rail model is based on a concept for continuous power transfer
from road to vehicle in urban environments. Since more people reside near city streets
than country highways, a greater need for pedestrian safety precaution is apparent as
compared to the Slide-in project described in section 2.2.5. A concept designed for
city use needs to be inherently safe and provide no means for pedestrians to come in
contact with high voltage.
A solution, provided through the courtesy of Dan Zethraeus, is to use rail sections
placed on the road in a dashed line pattern. is is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Every
section is initially connected to ground V0. When a vehicle connects to the rail, it
starts to communicate with a positioning system that tries to determine the vehicle's
position. When the position is established, the closest section to either of the contact
points A, B or C is powered with a voltage Vr. Only every second section can be
powered in this manner, thus always ensuring a closed circuit between Vr and V0.
Consequently, when a vehicle disconnects from the rail, the system stops powering
the sections.
.
A CB
V0 V0 (Vr)Vr (V0)V0V0 (Vr)
lx
>10 cm
2ly
400 cm
ly
200 cm
Figure 3.2: Rail and pickup dimensions.
e safety lies in the rail section sizing. In the illustration, each rail section length
is lx separated at a spacing of 5 cm. e current pickup consists of three point contacts
on a metal slip mounted in the centre of the vehicle underbody. e point contacts
are evenly spaced out over a distance of 2ly. Measured from the centre to either front
or back, this yields a maximum of lx+ly rail in contact with the vehicle. Assuming a
vehicle length of at least 4 m, the system can easily be dimensioned so that the vehicle
body cover the powered sections at all time.
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3.3 Sensors
An important feature of the sensors are very good contact with the rail. is means
that the connection must not break due to road noise, road bumps or other vibrations
that propagate to the vehicle. erefore, the idea is to use multiple-contact sensors.
e more contact points, the higher the probability of an unperturbed contact with
the rail. Additionally, the sensors must be resilient and be unaﬀected by vehicle vibra-
tions. Such multiple-contact elastic sensors closely resembles painting brushes, why
they simply are referred to as brushes in this report. Since the brushes are not meant
to conduct electricity, but rather sense the rail potential, the brush ﬁlaments can be
kept thin. is makes them rather fragile. ey were therefore placed behind the
sturdier current pickups for protection against any formation of ice or soil that could
cause damage. is is pictured in Figure 3.3.
.
pickup sensor pickup sensorpickup sensor
vvehicle
Figure 3.3: Sensors placed behind current pickups.
3.3.1 Rail-to-brush interface
A good contact can not be guaranteed at all times. Even if very ﬁne ﬁlaments are
used that do not lift from the rails, the contact will brake if something highly resistive
comes between the rails and brushes. For instance, this could happen a cold winter day
when ice form on the rail sections. Of course, if the pickup is designed to somehow
remove the ice and snow with absolute certainty, this is not a problem. Most likely
though, even well-designed brushes will lose contact with the rails from time to time.
erefore, such a scenario must be considered.
e interface between rail and brushes are depicted in Figure 3.4. Here, resistors
represent the contact points. Resistance is low for a good connection and high for a
bad.
.
A
Ra
Va
B
Rb
Vb
C
Rc
Vc
Figure 3.4: Electric connection from rail to brushes.
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Figure 3.5: Sensor circuit. Finds V0 and checks if it is well-deﬁned.
3.3.2 Brush-to-chassis circuitry
When the rail potentials have been collected, regardless the connection quality from
rail to brushes, three potentials are sent on-board the vehicle. e next step is to
identify the potentials as either Vr or V0, thereby chosing a ground reference Vgnd.
One way to do so is to use the circuit in Figure 3.5, which in principle does the same
thing as the circuit described in section 3.5.
e output of the circuit is explained with a truth table, see Table 3.3. High
potentials and closed switches are represented with 1, whereas low potentials and
open switches are represented with 0. For example, if Va = V0 and Vb = VC = Vr, both
switches atA are closed. If instead Va = Vb = V0 and Vc = Vr, one switch atA and one
atB are closed. Note that for all possible inputs, there are always two switches closed,
both connected to V0. us, Vgnd = V0 will always be the ground reference. en
again, this is only true in a fault-free scenario. erefore, when faults are introduced
to the matrix, the possible outputs must be reconsidered.
Table 3.3: Truth table for sensors. Fault-free scenario.
Input Output
Va Vb Vc gac gab gba gbc gcb gca
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
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Here, the only faults considered are weak or completely lost rail connections. Al-
though dysfunctional switches or broken voltage sensors would indeed be problem-
atic, it does not fall within the scope of this thesis to evaluate the need for redundancy.
Furthermore, the single fault criteria approach is used. Hence, as previously described,
a fault is represented by a non-zero value for either Ra, Rb or Rc. To determine its
inﬂuence on Vgnd, the voltage across the arbitrary switch gxy needs to be calculated.
Here, x and y are placeholders for any of a, b or c. Mathematically, the voltage can
be expressed as
vxy =
RI
2RI +RII
 
Vx   Vy

: (3.1)
is is actually the voltage (gate voltage) that controls gxy. If it is higher than a certain
threshold voltage, the switch is closed, otherwise the switch is open. Continuing from
here, (3.1) is extended to a function of Vr−V0, i.e.
vxy =
RI
2RI +RII +Rx +Ry
(Vr   V0) ; (3.2)
where it has been assumed that Vx is connected to Vr and Vy to V0. For any non-zero
(and positive) value of Rx or Ry, the gate voltage would be lower than in a fault-free
scenario. e larger the fault, the less the voltage. Yet, since single fault scenarios are
assumed, the two faults can not exist simultaneously. WithRy = 0, (3.2) is simpliﬁed
to
vxy =
RI
2RI +RII +Rx
(Vr   V0) : (3.3)
With an opposite rail potential polarity, (3.3) is instead expressed as
vxy =
RI
2RI +RII +Rx
(V0   Vr) : (3.4)
It should be obvious that equal potentials lead to vxy = 0.
It is worth noting that (3.3) and (3.4) are approximations, although in this case
extremely good ones. ey are derived with the assumption that open switches have
very large resistances. Since all non-zero values of vxy require the input potentials to
include both V0 and Vr, switches connected to one of the potentials (Vr) will always
be open. Furthermore, the fault is assumed to be either very large (open circuit) or
close to zero (short circuit), resulting in the two possible outcomes
vxy =
RI
2RI +RII
(Vr   V0) (3.5)
and
vxy = 0 (3.6)
for zero and large values, respectively.
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(a) One well-deﬁned potential (V0)
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(b) Two well-deﬁned potentials
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(c) One well-deﬁned potential (Vr)
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Va
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Vr
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(d) Two well-deﬁned potentials
Figure 3.6: Considered fault scenarios between brushes and rail.
ere are four possible single fault scenarios, as seen in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.6a
and Figure 3.6c result in one well-deﬁned potential, whereas Figure 3.6b and Figure
3.6d result in two well-deﬁned potentials. For a truth table over these scenarios, see
Table 3.4. Note that the ﬂoating potential Vc is determined from Va and Vb. It can
therefore amount to ½. is is not enough to close a switch, though, as long as the
gate threshold is set accordingly. Also note that a brush positioned in a rail section
gap has a ﬂoating potential as well. Such a scenario is therefore included.
Resistances are chosen so that the model did not violate the minimum and max-
imum voltages for gates and voltage sensors. Since typical max and min values are
much lower than the system working voltage Vr, the values were picked based on the
relation
RI  RII  RIII  RIV: (3.7)
With RI = 500 
, RII = 59 k
, RIII = 5 M
 and RIV = 595 M
, the measured
voltages are kept between −5 V and 5 V at Vr = 600 V and the max current is kept
below 10 mA.
Table 3.4: Truth table for senors. Vc is assumed to be ﬂoating.
Input Output
Va Vb Vc gac gab gba gbc gcb gca
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1
2
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1
2
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
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3.4 Control Unit & Current Source
e main task of the control unit and current source is to ensure ground potential in
the chassis. e idea is to process Vgnd supplied from the sensors together with Vch
from chassis in a -processor. It can be described in the following steps:
1. e potential diﬀerence vgnd = Vch−Vgnd is measured and sent to a -processor.
is could be done either directly with the processor or with a separate volt-
meter. Caution has be taken if measuring directly with the processor since they
are typically sensitive to over-voltages and negative voltages.
2. A reference signal sref is generated based on vgnd and a desired response time.
e signal must be able to steer vgnd towards a reference voltage vref.
3. An accepted value for ifeed is calculated based on the reference voltage and
compared to the feed current's momentary value. If sref would mean a too
high or too low ifeed, a signal is generated to control certain safety measures.
An example would be to disconnect the vehicle from the grid.
4. e signal sref is sent to a controlled current source that feeds a current ifeed to
the chassis. In the end, sref was chosen so that sref = ifeed.
3.4.1 The reference voltage vref
A reference voltage must be low enough to ensure an accepted touch current at all
times. is includes a margin for possible voltage drops in the sensors that make Vgnd
diﬀer from V0. e reference voltage is determined from a criterion on the wanted
chassis potential Vgnd+vref, i.e.
jVgnd + vrefj  imaxRmin; (3.8)
where imax = 2 mA andRmin = 2 k
 are the maximum allowed touch current and the
minimum possible resistance of a human body, respectively. Note that vref is a ﬁxed
value that must suﬃce for all possible values of Vgnd. Assume
0  Vgnd M (3.9)
for some positive constant M. Combining (3.8) and (3.9) yields
 imaxRmin  vref  imaxRmin  M: (3.10)
In the best of worlds, M is close to zero and the natural choice would be vref = 0 V.
A better approach could be to pick a slightly negative value, since the more M diﬀers
from zero, the tighter the interval (3.10) becomes. In a worst case scenario with
M = 8 V, the voltage vref = -4 V is the only viable option. However, for the sake of
this report, vref = 0 V and M = 0 V are assumed. Note that if vgnd is scaled down with
the use of series resistors (see Figure 3.5), vref must be scaled down with the same
factor.
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3.4.2 Maximum and minimum value of ifeed
e main reason for a restriction on ifeed is spelt fault detection. As will be explained
in the next paragraph, the required feed current is highly dependent on fault size.
It also depends on the chosen reference voltage. To ﬁnd a mathematical expression
for it, a model similar to that in Figure 2.2 from section 2.1.1 is considered. Since
the feed current in steady state can be characterised as d.c., all a.c. components have
been excluded. is also includes the isolated parts, since they do not aﬀect the touch
current as long as the converter works properly. A new model — the grid-to-ground
(GTG) model — is depicted in Figure 3.7. Two levels of simpliﬁcation are present.
e lower level of Figure 3.7a means a higher complexity, and vice versa for the higher
level of Figure 3.7b. Note that a current source has been placed acrossR1, but placing
it at R2 would have yielded similar results.
e resistances in Figure 3.7b is derived as
R2 =
(R2 +R0)RtRh
(R2 +R0) (Rt +Rh) +RtRh
(3.11)
and
R1 = Rr +
R1v1
v1  R1ifeed (3.12)
where v1 is the voltage across R1. It is given by
v1 = Vr   Vref  RrVref
R2
: (3.13)
Furthermore, the voltage vh across Rh can be expressed as
vh =
R2
R1 +R2
vr
=
R2 (v1  R1ifeed)
R1v1 + (Rr +R2) (v1  R1ifeed)
vr
(3.14)
.Vr
Rr R1
V0
R0 R2
Rt
Rh
ifeed
(a) GTG model – level 1
.Vr
R1 R

2
(b) GTG model – level 2
Figure 3.7: D.c. model of an electric vehicle connected to the grid.
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where the last expression is derived with the use of (3.12). e voltage vh can also be
expressed as
vh = Vref (3.15)
which, combined with (3.11) and (3.14), yields an expression for ifeed,
ifeed =
v1
R1

R2vr   Vref (R1 +Rr +R2)
R2vr   Vref (Rr +R2)

: (3.16)
Since the reference potential was chosen Vref = 0, (3.17) can be simpliﬁed to
ifeed =
Vr
R1
(3.17)
with the use of (3.13). Note that R1 represents a fault from chassis to Vr.
In a fault-free scenario, no feed current can ﬂow between pickup and chassis. is
is not a problem in itself, since the conductive properties of the tires would be enough
to keep Vch close to ground potential. However, it would make it hard to determine
whether the control unit is working or not. If a fault was to occur without a functional
control unit, the chassis potential could settle at a dangerous level. By introducing
two small predeﬁned faults R1 and R2, a feed current would ﬂow even in a fault-free
scenario, thus equalise a non-functional control unit with ifeed = 0 mA. Observing
the chassis potential would also work.
As a last remark, a small current margin would make room for ﬂuctuations in the
regulation process. It was chosen to 5% of the feed current for the given accepted
fault Rlimit = 100 k
. Furthermore, the predeﬁned faults were R1 = R2 = 10 M
,
resulting in a maximum feed current of 6.3 mA and a minimum of slightly more than
0 mA.
3.4.3 Reﬂections on current source properties
e feed current has to come from somewhere on-board the vehicle. In traditional
electric vehicles, there are two sources to chose from: the traction battery and the
auxiliary battery. Since the feed current is quite small, it does not seem to matter
which battery to draw it from. However, the need for galvanic isolation must be
evaluated regardless choice of battery. In this report, the actually need of isolation has
not been determined. e use of it is recommended, though, since it is better to be
safe than sorry.
Up to this point, the discussion has only included d.c. elements and steady state
characteristics. However, at the exact time a fault occurs, there is an instant change in
Vch and ih. is is because a d.c. model has no voltage or current damping properties.
Although the control unit quickly adopts to the new state and sets Vch to Vref, humans
could already have been exposed to a dangerously high voltage. To introduce voltage
damping, a capacitor is simply connected across the voltage source as depicted in
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.
R1 1 mF ifeed
Figure 3.8: The current source and capacitor across R1.
Figure 3.8. Voltage peaks are then absorbed in the capacitor, which gives the control
unit some time to adopt to the changes. e capacitance value is determined from
how much damping is needed and was chosen to C = 1 mF.
3.5 Final Model Overview
Here, the diﬀerent system parts described in this chapter aremerged together (Figure 3.9).
e model is color-coded as follows:
RED On-board battery and load, i.e. the load circuit.
BLUE Diode rectiﬁer as part of the battery charging system.
VIOLET Sensor circuit as it is intended. It is similar to a three-phase full-wave bridge
rectiﬁer without the three diodes that should be connected to high potential.
e model that is described in Figure 3.5 is mainly used to increase the simu-
lation stability. In principle, both models do the same thing.
ORANGE ResistanceR1, resistanceR2, the current source and the added capacitor,
i.e. the compensation circuit.
.
Vr
V0
A CB b
V
a c
Vch V0
V0 VrVrV0Vr
Figure 3.9: An overview of the full model.
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Chapter4
Simulation
e software used for simulation is Simulink, a graphical programming environment
for modelling and simulation. Notably, the most frequently used library is Simscape,
which provides means of modelling physical electric system. e simulation settings
are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Simulation settings.
MATLAB version 2015a
Type variable-step
Solver ode15s
Max step size 10 ms
Relative tolerance 10 3
Absolute tolerance auto
Simulations are separated into two phases. e ﬁrst phase involves creating a
reference model of an EV connected to externally grounded rails. is includes the
possibility to introduce faults at diﬀerent locations and a model of a human touching
the electric chassis. In the second phase, the safety system is added. Initially, this
addition introduced too much complexity to the model and the simulations would
not run. erefore, a new model was created to include only the important parts of
the system. Galvanically isolated circuits on-board the vehicle was removed, resulting
in a vehicle model that closely resembles the GTG-model explained in section 3.4.2.
4.1 Reference Model
e top layer of the model is shown in Figure 4.1. Starting at the rails, an ideal
voltage source sets the two potentials to Vr and V0. Two switches, located between
the vehicle and the rail, resemble the pickup mounted on the vehicle underbody.
29
30 Simulation
ey are controlled manually but typically only used as short circuit connections.
e other blocks in the ﬁgure model a grid-connected EV, a human, vehicle tyres and
a voltmeter. Note that amperemeters look similar to the voltmeter but are labeled
with an A instead of a V.
Continuing on to the vehicle model depicted in Figure 4.2, an ideal solid-state
transformer is used as a converter to model galvanic isolation. For stability purposes, a
decoupling capacitorCprim and an inductorLsec are placed on the converter's primary
and secondary side, respectively. e secondary side is then connected to a traction
battery with voltage Vbattery and internal resistance Remk. Another decoupling capac-
itor Cll decouples the battery from the inverter. e capacitance is chosen so that the
total energy stored equals that in [6]. For simulation speed purposes, the inverter and
motor are modelled as a resistive load Rload only. is ﬁnalises the circuit that draws
traction power from the grid.
Four connections between the chassis and the on-board voltage class B circuit
exist. Two of them model the monitoring system as described in section 2.1.4 and
the other two are faults that can be introduced manually. ere are also connections
from chassis to primary side of the converter that represent primary side faults. ey
are themain faults considered during simulations and are denotedR1 andR2. Finally,
the human model is shown in Figure 4.3. Just like the faults, the human is controlled
with a switch and can be disconnected from the chassis when desired.
For models of the rail, the pickup, the converter, the traction battery circuitry,
the faults and the monitoring system, see Appendix B. For a collection of default
parameter values, see Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Default base model parameters.
Vbattery 600 V R1 10 M

Vr 600 V R2 10 M

V0 0 V Rt 10 M

Cp 600 nF Rp 375 k

Cn 600 nF Rn 375 k

Cprim 10 mF Rload 5 

Cskin 220 nH Remk 10 m

Cll 600 F Rskin 1.5 k

Lsec 1 H Rbody 500 

Rshort 1 
 Ropen 1 G
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Figure 4.1: Overview of reference model.
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4.1.1 Characteristics
Some characteristics of the model are shown below. Figure 4.4 shows the on-board
fault monitoring system response for three fault levels at Rn and three capacitance
values of Cp and Cn. In Figure 4.5, touch voltage and touch current are plotted as
functions of R1 and R2. Other parameters are at default values.
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Figure 4.4: Response of an on-board monitoring system when faults
and stored energies are introduced. Units in M
 and F.
.
.
102 103 104 105 106 107
10 1
100
101
102
103
Rx (
)
v h
(V
)
Touch voltage
. .R1
. .R2
.
.
102 103 104 105 106 107
10 1
100
101
102
103
2 mA
Rx (
)
i h
(m
A
)
Touch current
. .R1
. .R2
Figure 4.5: Voltage across and current through a human for different
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fault from chassis to V0 (R2) is not dangerous to a human body.
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4.2 Implementation of Safety System
As previously mentioned, the model stopped working after the safety system was in-
troduced. erefore, most of the vehicle circuitry was removed. is includes the
converter, the battery, the load and the monitoring system with corresponding faults.
An overview of this new model is shown in Figure 4.6.
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Vr
V0
Rectified
rail
in+
in-
out+
ctrl
out-
Pickup
f(x) = 0
-+
Tires
-+
Human
V -++ -
R1
+-
R2 Chassis:
0 V initially
vgnd
-
+
ctrl
Control unit &
current source
A
B
C
 vgnd 
ch
Sensors
A, phase 0
B, phase 126
C, phase 252
Non-rectified
rail
Figure 4.6: The new model.
4.2.1 Modiﬁcations
Apart from the removal of the on-board voltage class B system, the pickup is mod-
iﬁed to better model a real situation. To simulate lost connection, random number
generators are introduced to randomly open the switches 1% of the time for a period
of 10 ms, see Figure 4.7. A control signal input is also introduced, mostly to illustrate
the existence of a signal to disconnect the vehicle from the grid.
1
in+ 2
out+
4
out-
5
in-
Y
Time fraction: 1%,
seed: 31415&1337,
time step: 10 ms
Y
s
c
vT
Rr
sc
vT
R0
S PS
S PS
vrp
v0p
3
ctrl
Figure 4.7: Modiﬁed pickup.
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4.2.2 Add-ons
In contrast to the pickup, which is assumed to have a working rectifying system,
the sensors need a diﬀerent source of voltage. erefore, another rail block is added
consisting of three voltage sources controlled with pulse generators (see Figure 4.8).
ey work at a common frequency of 4.17 Hz and a phase shift of 0°, 126°and 252°,
respectively, that sets the voltage high and low. e phase shifts correspond to the
dimensions from Figure 3.2 and the frequency is calculated with
f =
2lr
vcar
; (4.1)
where lr = 1 m is a rail section length and vcar = 30 m/s the vehicle velocity. us,
the potentials are set to high every other section as they would in a physical system.
Moreover, rail section gaps and soiled rail sections are introduced by means of variable
resistors at each contact points. e phase and frequency controlling the gap resis-
tances are adjusted to correctly match (4.1), whereas soil are introduced manually.
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S PS
S PS
S PS
1
A,
phase 0
2
B,
phase 126
3
C,
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-
+
PS
gap
-
+
PS
 gap 
-
+
PS
  gap  
ctrl
ctrl
ctrl -
+
PS
Ra
-
+
PS
Rb
-
+
PS
Rc
ctrl
ctrl
ctrl
Figure 4.8: Non-rectiﬁed rail model.
e sensor model is more or less identical to the one illustrated in Figure 3.5, but
there are minor diﬀerences. One is that this model has small resistances connected
between gates and chassis, as seen in Figure 4.9. ey are introduced to cope with
convergence problems in the transient initialisation process. Moreover, voltmeters
are added to measure the gate voltages across the 500 
-resistors to know the state of
the gates, i.e. to check if the ground reference is good enough. is works very well,
since the gates are modelled as voltage controlled switches with a voltage threshold of
4.99 V to detect even the slightest of voltage drops. Of course, using physical devices
such as MOSFETs would have been more realistic, but they sadly invoked stability
problems during simulations.
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As vgnd is continuouslymonitored, the instantaneous values are sent to the control
unit block. It consists of an in-port for vgnd, two out-ports for sref and the control
signal, a PI-regulator and logics to detect faults. e regulator components are in the
top of Figure 4.10 with parameters written next to the corresponding blocks. e
workings of the blocks should be rather self-explanatory.
e fault detection logics consists of blocks below the regulator. Two switches are
used to check for:
An elevated chassis potential e output from the block vch check is 0 below 4 V
and 1 above 4 V.
A reached maximum feed current e output from the block ifeed check is 0 below
6.3 mA and 1 above 6.3 mA.
When either of these two outputs turns to 1, a feedback loop ensures that the ctrl
signal does not change back to 0.
1
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1/Ti=
1/(1/1.2)
S PS
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1=>4 V
 0 
 1 
Ensures
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3
ctrl
Y U
1 us delay
S PSctrl
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min: 0 mA
ifeed check:
0=<6.3 mA,
1=>6.3 mA
  0  
  1  
ctrl check:
0=ok,
1=not ok
iref
2
sref
Figure 4.10: Control unit.
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Lastly, sref is sent to a current source and converted to the feed current ifeed =
sref. e stabilising capacitor of 1 mF is correctly connected in parallel with the
source block as seen in Figure 4.11. Note that both the control unit block and the
current source block are subsystems in the block "Control unit & current source", see
Appendix B.
1
+
2
-
3
sref
-+
ifeed
Figure 4.11: Current source.
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Chapter5
Result
Results from simulations are shown here. roughout this chapter, all faults are lo-
cated at R1 and are introduced at 0.5 s. A reference case has been added below that
shows the eﬀect on a human body that touches an electrical chassis. e human
electric characteristics are at default values.
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, touch currents for a fault-free scenario are not dan-
gerous to a human, not even for a human soaked in water. At a fault of roughly
300 k
, the current becomes noticeable. Beyond 300 k
, currents start to become
harmful.
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Figure 5.1: Touch currents without the safety system. Human interfer-
ence is modeled from start. The d.c. threshold for tingling sensation is
marked with a black dashed line.
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5.1 Introducing the Safety System
After introducing the safety system, faults at R1 are counteracted as the chassis po-
tential is kept close to Vref = V0. is is shown in Figure 5.2 and corresponding feed
currents in Figure 5.3. Troughs are due to lost connection to Vr during 10 s.
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Figure 5.2: Chassis potential to ground. The safety system is active
from start.
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Figure 5.3: Feed current required to control vch from Figure 5.2. The
dashed line indicates a chosen maximum accepted current of 6.3 mA.
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5.2 Adding Human Interference
With the safety system active, a human with a critically low total body resistance
(2000 
) is protected from electric shock. Touch currents are shown in Figure 5.4
and corresponding feed currents in Figure 5.5. As previously mentioned, troughs are
due to lost connection to Vr. Additionally, note the dangerously high peak at 2.7 s.
.
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Figure 5.4: Touch currents for a human.
.
.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
6.3 mA
Time (s)
i f
ee
d
(m
A
)
Feed current ifeed
. .No fault
. .300 k

. .100 k

. .90 k
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5.3 Varying the Capacitance
e capacitor bank connected across the current source greatly aﬀect the time be-
tween fault occurrence and peak potential of the chassis, as seen in Figure 5.6 with
R1 = 10 k
. In Figure 5.7, a very large fault of 10 
 is instead introduced. Note that
feedback and the regulation process are not adopted to the new capacitance values.
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Figure 5.6: The capacitor bank's inﬂuence on the chassis potential for
a fault R1 = 10 k
. The maximum allowed chassis potential is 4 V.
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Chapter6
Discussion
Questioning the existence of a protective earth connection is a very sensitive matter.
Indeed, it constitutes a very eﬀective way to protect personnel from electric chock. In
this chapter, certain aspects and choices that may seem unjustiﬁed are explained more
thoroughly.
6.1 Insulation vs. Active Components
Traditionally, non-grounded vehicles conductively connected to an earth grounded
electric supply must have double or triple insulation that encapsulates high-voltage
systems. An example of this is trolleybuses as explained in section 2.2.4. In principle,
this approach is possible for the charging technology used in this project. If applied,
however, the extra insulation would mean a signiﬁcant weight increase in cars that are
much smaller (and lighter) than buses. It would also add volume to cars in a way that
may be unwanted. In the end, though, extra insulation may be unavoidable, but it
was the purpose of this project to ﬁnd a solution that minimises the use of it.
It is arguable that an active compensation of fault currents may violate insulation
criteria too much. e addition of a current source in the way it was done in this
project assumes relatively bad insulation of the chassis. A too high insulation resis-
tance would require an extremely high source voltage to control the compensation
current as desired. Although it may be possible to ﬁnd a technical solution to this, it
would be hard to convince authorities that such a system does not infringe on safety
regulations.
6.2 The Compensation Capacitor
A capacitor of 1 mF was added to the compensation circuit in the ﬁnal stage of the
simulation. e reason behind this is twofold: it models stray capacitances and pre-
vents the chassis potential from changing faster than the regulator can handle. Since
stray capacitances are typically much smaller than 1 mF (at least in a system with a
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good design), most of the capacitance comes from an actual physical capacitor placed
between chassis and high voltage. As it turns out, though, such a large capacitor would
probably add more problems than it would solve.
e simulations does not model the transformation and rectiﬁcation of the grid
voltage. is means that a 300 Hz ripple with an amplitude of about 30 volts will
ride on top of the grid d.c. signal. Such a substantial a.c. component would easily
propagate though the added capacitor and straight to the chassis. erefore, it is
worth noting that the capacitor is not essential to the system and can be removed if
necessary.
6.3 Additional Topics
Further discussion on relevant topics is shown here.
6.3.1 Absence of components
Some important components were not included in the simulation model. is in-
cludes the three-phase diode rectiﬁer, the load and the battery. It was not the inten-
sion of this project to exclude them from the ﬁnal model, but it turned out to be best
that way. It should be considered when consulting the results.
6.3.2 Voltage peaks
Peaks as the ones seen in Figure 5.4 are to be expected. ey are caused by a drop in
compensation current following a lost connection to Vr. e current drops because
the chassis potential are naturally kept close to ground when a connection to a high
electric potential is not present, i.e. a compensation current is redundant in such a
case. A fraction of a second later, when the connection to Vr is reestablished, there
is once again a need for a compensation current. However, it is initially too small.
Consequently, the chassis potential are higher than the reference and the touch current
is temporarily increased.
6.3.3 Non-converging equations in Simulink
Non-converging equations was the main source of interruptions during the simula-
tions work. is was probably due to the author's poor Simulink experience. ere-
fore, another software may have been a better alternative.
6.3.4 Resistivity of road slush
ere is little to no information to be found on possible fault sizes. Since road slush is
likely to stick to the side of the pickup during normal operation, it would be valuable
to determine the resistivity of slush.
Chapter7
Conclusions & Future Work
Conclusions and future work are presented here. Overall, the project has been success-
ful in ﬁnding a plausible alternative to a safety ground connection, although further
work is required.
7.1 Conclusions
e concept of an active grounding system show promising results. It is proven that
arbitrarily large faults can successfully be suppressed. By calculating the required com-
pensation current needed to suppress a certain fault, too large faults can be detected
by means of current monitoring. Plausible fault sizes would need to be determined in
order to design a model properly, through, since larger faults seem to require a faster
system response.
A lost ground reference is detected directly with the sensor unit from Figure 3.5.
Note that the unit also detects a lost Vr-reference as a safety risk, although it is not.
is is not a problem from a safety perspective, but it would prevent battery charging
more often than it should.
Since the simulations do not include all relevant components in an electric vehicle,
the results do not cover all scenarios.
7.2 Future Work
Simulations are great for model evaluation, but building a physical model is eventually
imperative. us, it would be a good next step to take. A physical model is partially
complete (see Appendix C), but it requires further electrical work. is includes work
on the sensor circuit, current source, capacitor bank and regulator unit.
ere is little to no information to be found on fault occurrence frequency and
possible fault sizes. For instance, ﬁnding the minimum plausible resistivity for road
slush would be a great contribution. Furthermore, time could be spent on faults that
only last for a short time. It could i.e. be slush on the pickup side that later falls of or
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is thawed away. Additional work could also include grounding system activation and
how it should be arranged.
Evaluation of ways to add redundancy and diversity to the system is also welcome.
It would certainly make the system more robust to diﬀerent fault scenarios. However,
adding too much complexity to a system could be problematic, so it needs to be
carefully considered.
As a ﬁnal remark, further evaluation of the sensor circuit is needed. Currently,
it does not diﬀerentiate a lost ground reference from a lost Vr-reference. A solution
could be to incorporate the pickup connectors in the sensor unit. Whenever the
contact with either V0 or Vr is completely lost, so is the possibility to charge the
battery. If designed in this manner, the system would not interrupt battery charging
but still provide protection.
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AppendixA
Symbols
Electrical symbols used in the report are shown here. ose used in Simulink blocks
are intentionally not shown.
.
resistor capacitor battery switch
ground chassis terminal intersection
transformer nMOS
+ 
voltage source controlled
current source
Symbols
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AppendixB
Simulink Blocks
A collection of most Simulink blocks that are not shown in the report. ey are added
in no speciﬁc order.
-
+
5
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0.6mF
1+
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+600V
DC V-
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Vload
A -+
iload
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-
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ctrl
Fault
-2
+2
-1
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10 mF
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A -+
V
-
+
A -+
V
-
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1
in+
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3
out+
4
out-
D.c./d.c. converter
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SPS
1
in+
2
out+
3
out-
4
in-
s_grid
s
c
vT
sc
vT
Reference model pickup
1
DC+
2
GND
3
DC-
- +
600 V DC
Reference model rail
- +
600 nF
1
-
2
+
-
+
PS
V- +
ctrl
On-board fault monitoring
iref
-
+
source
irefVref
regulator
1
Vref
2 -
3
+
Regulator and current source
AppendixC
Experiment
e part of the experimental setup that was successfully built can be seen in the ﬁgure
below. It models the rail, the pickup, the brushes and the electric chassis. All compo-
nents are mounted on a wooden foundation to increase stability and make the model
easier to move around. e piece is roughly 34 x 23 x 25 cubic cm at its maximum
length, height and depth. Illustrations of the cross section and front panel are shown
on the next page.
Physical model of rail, pickup, brushes and chassis
e main component constitutes a car alternator from which the stator is re-
moved. Two aluminum plates of roughly 160 x 30 x 1 cubic mm models the rail
sections. ey are attached to the rotor with steel wires and separated with small
pieces of insulation material. e plates are connected to slip rings that allow them to
be powered while the rotor is rotating. Furthermore, three copper cylinders of about
80 mm in height and 3 mm in radius are used as the pickup connections, whereas
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IC
VC
IBVB
IA
VA
CORE
!rail
Vr
V0
Cross section of the model
three similarly sized steel cylinders are used as the brushes. Two small springs are sol-
dered to one end of each brush cylinder for an improved rail-to-brush contact. e
pickup cylinders are instead prepared with only one spring attached to a small piece
of copper and some conductive elastic threads for better conduction properties. e
cylinders are placed in the centre of squared pieces of plastic that are mounted on the
alternator metal frame to ensure isolation of the frame from the rail working voltage.
Cylinder placement is chosen so that the pickup and brushes are in contact with
both rails at all times. Wiring is arranged so that all connections are available on the
front panel below. Additionally, a model of the car chassis is created as a metal plate
on top of both an insulator and a grounded metal plate, placed next to the alternator.
To manually drive the system, an electric screwdriver is to be used.
.
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